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Introduction: Atrocity Crimes
Litigation During 2008
David Scheffer∗
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In conjunction with the second annual Atrocity Crimes
Litigation Year-in-Review (2008) Conference convened by the
Center for International Human Rights at Northwestern University
School of Law on January 29, 2009, the editors of the
Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights
invited three of the speakers to draft the articles appearing in this
special edition. The purpose of the annual conference is to provide
a review by practitioners and scholars of the immediately
preceding year’s jurisprudence and practice of the leading
international and hybrid criminal tribunals. These include the
International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia, and the War Crimes Chamber in the Court of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Aside from the authors described below, the
other speakers included Chief Prosecutor Hassan Jallow of the
Rwanda Tribunal, Chief Prosecutor Stephen Rapp of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, Deputy Prosecutor Norman Farrell of the
Yugoslav Tribunal, International Co-Prosecutor Robert Petit of the
Cambodia Tribunal, and former Judge Elizabeth Fahey of the
Bosnia War Crimes Chamber. Also speaking were Jonathan
Fanton, the President of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation, and Professors John Hagan and Stephen Kinzer of
Northwestern University.1
This special edition publishes outstanding articles by
Professor Beth Van Schaack of Santa Clara University School of
∗
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1
The full transcript and video and audio records of the conference can be
accessed at www.law.northwestern.edu/humanrights/events.html.
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Law, Defense Counsel Gillian Higgins of the Yugoslav Tribunal,
and Legal Advisor Rod Rastan of the Office of the Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Court. All three authors spoke at the
conference and further elaboration of their views can be found on
the posted transcript.
Professor Van Schaack served as the distinguished academic
scholar of the conference and her article, Atrocity Crimes
Litigation: 2008 Year-In-Review, amply demonstrates why she was
chosen for the task.2 Van Schaack provides a tour de force of the
jurisprudence emerging from the international criminal law (ICL)
tribunals during the calendar year of 2008. While she notes that
“the rate of innovation in substantive ICL is slowing
considerably,” she recognizes that recent decisions “are
increasingly applying established law to novel facts. ICL has thus
begun to exhibit features of a more mature body of law with
modern innovations happening primarily at the outer edges of
doctrine.” She addresses several legal concepts and describes how
the tribunals developed a better understanding of them as the year
progressed.
Perhaps one of the most significant characteristics of the
atrocity crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes is the requirement that the commission of such crimes
achieve sufficient gravity, or magnitude, before they fall within the
jurisdiction of the ICL tribunals. Van Schaack describes how the
Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court examined
the gravity requirement in its consideration of whether to approve
an arrest warrant against two defendants in the Democratic
Republic of Congo situation before the Court. Though the rulings
date back to 2006, the related Appeals Chamber decision of that
year was not made available publicly until April 28, 2008, when
the arrest warrant was unsealed. The Appeals Chamber ruled that
war crimes, as defined in Article 8(1) of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, must retain a lower threshold of
gravity than would be expected of genocide or crimes against
humanity. In other words, the Rome Statute affords the possibility
of a relatively smaller magnitude of war crimes to trigger the
Court’s jurisdiction even though there is an invitation to examine,
“in particular,” war crimes committed “as part of a plan or policy
2

See Beth Van Schaack, Atrocity Crimes Litigation: 2008 Year-In-Review, 7
NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 170 (2009).
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or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.” As the lead
U.S. negotiator of the Rome Statute, I can confirm that the Appeals
Chamber preserved the original intent of the negotiators. Indeed,
the United States originally wanted to make the high threshold
requirement mandatory for war crimes in the Rome Statute but
most of its NATO allies countered that to do so would leave the
erroneous impression that there was a high bar for any prosecution
of violations of grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
which are a key part of Article 8. The negotiators concluded that
the “in particular” language was most appropriate as it suggested
the importance of prosecuting war crimes of considerable gravity
but did not make it an automatic requirement for jurisdiction.
The Appeals Chamber also rejected the remarkably narrow
view of the Pre-Trial Chamber in describing the categories of
perpetrators who may be prosecuted before the Court. Rather than
focus only on the most senior leaders involved in the situation
under investigation and those most capable of preventing the
commission of atrocity crimes, the Appeals Chamber allowed that
“individuals who are not at the very top of an organization may
still carry considerable influence and commit, or generate the
widespread commission of, very serious crimes.” As Van Schaack
writes, “the Appeals Chamber appropriately refocused the gravity
inquiry on qualitative rather than quantitative factors, ensuring
flexibility in pursuing cases and enhancing the deterrent power of
the Court.”
Van Schaack examines principles of military necessity,
proportionality, and distinction in the prosecution of war crimes
during 2008. The Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslav Tribunal
largely affirmed the Trial Chamber’s findings in the Martić case,
namely that the defendant’s order to use twelve M-87 Orkan
rockets containing cluster bomb warheads against Zagreb
constituted a widespread attack against the civilian population and
was per se an indiscriminate attack notwithstanding the presence
of any lawful military targets. The Appeals Chamber ruled that
Milan Martić knew how such shelling could result in deadly injury
to civilians and that it could not be viewed as a lawful reprisal or as
self-defense.
In the Strugar case before the Yugoslav Tribunal, the
Appeals Chamber confirmed the standards for what constitutes a
victim’s direct participation in hostilities: the prosecution must
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show beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time of the injury, the
victim was not committing “acts of war which by their nature or
purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel or
equipment of the enemy’s armed forces.” Van Schaack recites the
interesting distinction made by the Appeals Chamber in what does
and does not constitute direct participation in hostilities as well as
the indirect participation that would not deny a civilian his or her
civilian immunity from attack. The Appeals Chamber emphasized
the case-by-case analysis required in determining a civilian’s
status.
In a judgment of critical importance to how the United States
and other governments should evaluate the fight against terrorism
within the context of warfare and the law of war, the Yugoslav
Tribunal determined in the Boškoski case that an armed conflict
existed in Macedonia in 2001 even though so-called terrorist acts
occurred within the context of other armed engagements. The Trial
Chamber ruled that what matters is “whether acts are perpetrated in
isolation or as part of a protracted campaign that entails the
engagement of both parties in hostilities. It is immaterial whether
the acts of violence perpetrated may or may not be characterized as
terrorist in nature.” Therefore, isolated acts of terrorism may not
reach the threshold of armed conflict, but “when there is protracted
violence of this type, especially where [the acts] require the
engagement of the armed forces in hostilities, such acts are
relevant to assessing the level of intensity with regard to the
existence of an armed conflict.” Van Schaack also describes how
the Trial Chamber sets forth factors that need to be considered in
determining the organizational character of an armed group (that
might also be viewed as a terrorist group) and thus, its relevance to
law of war categorization and analysis.
The ICL tribunals addressed many other key issues that Van
Schaack reviews in her article. These include how the Appeals
Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone clarified and
strengthened the crime of recruiting child soldiers and, in a
“landmark opinion,” established the crime of forced marriage as an
“Other Inhumane Act” among crimes against humanity. By
contrast, she writes, gender justice received setbacks when (a) the
Yugoslav Tribunal refused to permit the Prosecution to amend the
indictment in the Lukić case to include crimes of rape, torture, and
enslavement allegedly committed within a rape camp established
by the defendants, and (b) the Rwanda Tribunal acquitted
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Tharcisse Muyunyi on rape charges in his trial after witnesses
could not be traced or refused to testify, leaving only witnesses
who were not raped by the specific group of subordinates led by
Mujunyi, even though their testimony was judged to be reliable by
the Trial Chamber.
¶9
In the Martić case, the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslav
Tribunal ruled that the Prosecution could not expand the term
“civilian” in the definition of crimes against humanity to include
hors de combat combatants, but also held that not every victim of a
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population must
be a civilian. Indeed, some hors de combat combatants could be
victims of crimes against humanity. Maintaining the legal
distinction between civilians and hors de combat combatants
remains essential, however. Van Schaack writes that in the Civil
Defense Forces case, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court
for Sierra Leone confirmed that an attack against a civilian
population can still provide the predicate for crimes against
humanity charges even where “the ultimate objective of the
fighting force was legitimate and/or aimed at responding to
aggressors.” In fact, there can be co-existing attacks of differing
legal consequence: one directed against a civilian population
alongside one targeting opposing forces.
¶10
Van Schaack concludes her article by reviewing the many
developments in the law governing forms of liability in ICL cases,
including joint criminal enterprise, superior responsibility, coperpetration, conspiracy, and chains of liability. The Pre-Trial
Chamber of the Cambodia Tribunal wrestled with the CoProsecutors’ attempt to establish a joint criminal enterprise in its
charges against Kaing Guek Eav (alias Duch) and ultimately
rejected its use, setting up an appeal that reached into 2009. The
interesting issue will be whether, on appeal, the Cambodia
Tribunal finds that joint criminal enterprise theory existed in the
late 1970’s as a theory of responsibility. The outcome also will
have profound influence on the imminent joint trial of four other
suspects.
¶11
In the Hadžihasaović case before the Yugoslav Tribunal, the
Appeals Chamber determined, in Van Schaack’s description, “that
there was no customary international law basis to hold a superior
liable for the crimes of his or her subordinates when such crimes
are committed prior to the superior assuming his or her position of
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command.” This finding (as well as the subsequent Orić judgment)
elicited strong dissenting views by three judges and Van Schaack
joins them when she argues, “The Hadžihasanović decision is
wrong as a matter of law, flawed as a matter of logic, and counterproductive as a matter of policy.” She believes that “it manifests all
of the grounds recognized by courts all over the world for
overturning prior precedent, notwithstanding the imperatives of
predictability and stability guaranteed by stare decisis.”
¶12
Defense Counsel Gillian Higgins provides a reality check in
her article, The Impact of the Size, Scope, and Scale of the
Milosevic Trial and the Development of Rule 73bis before the
ICTY.3 Slobodan Milosevic died in 2006 before the Yugoslav
Tribunal reached judgment on the sixty-three counts against him in
three indictments. But enough time now has transpired for a sober
assessment of how his trial was conducted and how indictments
and procedures of the ICL tribunals could be improved in the
future. Higgins describes the evolution of the indictments against
Milosevic and makes a compelling argument for why the Appeals
Chamber probably got it wrong when it ordered that the three
indictments pertaining to atrocity crimes in Kosovo, Croatia, and
Bosnia, respectfully, “be tried together on the basis that the acts
alleged therein formed part of the same transaction.” If the Kosovo
indictment, for example, had been prosecuted alone and perhaps
first, there would have been a better chance that judgment could
have been reached on at least one set of alleged crimes within a
reasonable period of time, which, in retrospect, we can safely
speculate would have occurred while Milosevic remained alive.
¶13
The long and ultimately dismissed Milosevic trial, with its
many delays, excursions into procedural disputes, and finally the
death of the defendant, had the positive effect, Higgins contends,
of increasing judicial powers under Rule 73bis of the Yugoslav
Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence to control the
presentation of the prosecution’s case. Armed with various
amendments to Rule 73bis, including one approved two months
after Milosevic’s death, the judges can better manage the number
of witnesses and time allotted to each, the number of crime sites or
incidents that are relevant for the presentation of evidence, the
3

See Gillian Higgins, The Impact of the Size, Scope, and Scale of the Milosevic
Trial and the Development of Rule 73bis before the ICTY, 7 NW. U. J. INT’L
HUM. RTS. 239 (2009).
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number of counts which the Prosecutor can charge in the
indictment, and the Prosecutor’s selection of counts upon which to
proceed. The Prosecutor, not surprisingly, has objected to how
Rule 73bis is being applied by the judges as it tends to replace their
reasoning for his on how to prosecute the charges against the
defendant.
¶14
One interesting consequence, however, is a diminution of the
historical record. I find it shortsighted how the Trial Chamber in
the Stanisic case simply concluded that “the Tribunal was
established to administer justice, and not to create a historical
record.” Tell that to the victims and to later generations of
Bosnians, Croatians, and Serbs. There has traditionally been a
balancing act in the ICL tribunals to ensure that a reasonable
record of historical value is recorded while rendering justice fairly,
including protection of the rights of the defendant under
international standards of due process. Being cavalier about the
historical record, which the prosecution has the ability to bring to
the forefront of the trial for good reason, undercuts those judges in
the ICL tribunals who acknowledge the historical record’s unique
value.
¶15
Nonetheless, Higgins presents the reader with a fascinating
“what if” scenario on the Milosevic trial that should better inform
how large, complex, and politically controversial atrocity crimes
trials could be better managed. There likely will be many of them
before the International Criminal Court and, as Higgins notes,
already its Prosecutor appears to be applying some lessons from
the Milosevic case by narrowly framing his indictments (a good
example being the Lubanga case).
¶16
In his article, Review of ICC Jurisprudence 2008, Rod
Rastan provides his own perspective at the International Criminal
Court on some of the same issues raised by Van Schaack.4 On
modes of liability, Rastan examines two Pre-Trial Chamber
decisions on confirmation of charges in 2008 and concludes that “a
distinct path for identifying the responsibility of principals among
a plurality of perpetrators” is being forged by the Court. Because
Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute is a more detailed and codified
treatment of individual criminal responsibility than has been the
4

See Rod Rastan, Review of ICC Jurisprudence 2008, 7 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM.
RTS. 261 (2009).
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experience of the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, the joint
criminal enterprise theory developed by the latter tribunals will not
translate easily or entirely to the International Criminal Court.
Although the control of the crime theory may be helpful as a
doctrinal guide to liability before the Court, Rastan postulates that
it may need to evolve either with more flexible types of
organizational structures in mind or with a broader framework for
principal liability. For example, he questions why the common
purpose doctrine of Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute is
necessarily viewed as a secondary form of liability that eschews
leadership crimes.
¶17
The highest profile litigation of 2008 before the International
Criminal Court was the Lubanga case where the non-disclosure of
documents obtained under conditions of confidentiality (Article
54(3)(e) of the Rome Statute) slammed head-on into the
Prosecutor’s duty to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence
(Article 67(2) of the Rome Statute). Rastan expertly explains that
the Appeals Chamber resolved the controversy by essentially
allowing the confidentiality privilege to trump the disclosure duty
regarding exculpatory evidence, but with a heavy dose of caveats
and guidelines that should prove very useful in future litigation.
¶18
Rastan’s discussion of victims’ participation in cases
highlights the ruling of the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga on July
11, 2008, namely that the harm alleged by a victim and his or her
personal interest in a particular case must be linked with the
charges confirmed against the accused. This and other judgments
of the Appeals Chamber “will have a significant impact in shaping
the contours of victims’ participation in future trial proceedings,”
he writes. Finally, Rastan provides an interesting summary of how
the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court has
reaffirmed the prohibition on “witness proofing” by the
prosecution despite the common practice of this procedure by the
Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals. He argues in favor of the Court
drawing its own procedural roadmap “rather than a fortiori
whether it can be discerned from principles and rules of
international law or general principles of law derived from national
laws of legal systems of the world.”
¶19
This special edition of the Journal, inspired by the Atrocity
Crimes Litigation Year-in-Review (2008) Conference, makes a
significant and timely contribution to a better understanding of the
ICL tribunals and their influence on the substantive development
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of international criminal law. I suspect the year 2009 and what
transpires at Northwestern University School of Law shortly
thereafter to record the evolution of the ICL tribunals will prove no
different.

